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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(a), this Court has jurisdiction to
review the opinion rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals on July 17, 2008. Further,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(5) and Utah R. App. P. 45, this Court has
jurisdiction to review said opinion pursuant to the Court's order dated November 20,
2008 granting Appellant River Crossing's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4), the following question is presented for this
Court's determination, together with any subsidiary questions fairly included therein:
1.

Whether the court of appeals erred in its determination of what constitutes an
appearance for purposes of rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

REFERENCE TO REPORTED DECISION
OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision was reported as Arbogast Family Trust v.
River Crossings. LLC, 2008 UT App 277. 191 P.3d 39.

1

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
URCP Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service: When required.
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court,
every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent
to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written motion other
than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment,
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties.
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that:
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court;
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be
served with all pleadings and papers;
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party;
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of judgment
under Rule 58A(d); and
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in default
for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
(Emphasis added).
URCP Rule 55. Default.1
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to
appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the
amount claimed and costs against the defendant if:
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear;
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be
made certain by computation.
(Emphasis added).

1

As discussed in Section V herein, Rule 55(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is distinctly different than Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

Nature of the Case
Appellant River Crossings, LLC ("River Crossings") seeks the certiorari review of

the Utah Court of Appeals' decision entered on July 17, 20082 wherein it was held that in
order for a party to "appear" for purposes of Rule 5(a)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a party is required to make a presentation or submission to the trial court.
Arbogast suggests the nature of this case review also involves an analysis of the meaning
of the word "appearance" as is relates to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule
55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
River Crossings advocates the deviation from long-standing policy in order to
adopt a liberal approach so as to allow even the slightest of efforts3 by a party to
constitute "appearance" for URCP Rule 5 and Rule 55 purposes. River Crossings
supports its position by stating that "virtually all of the federal courts to have considered
this issue have adopted the position that an 'appearance' under the federal counterpart
merely requires an indication of a 'clear purpose to defend the suit.'" (Appellant Brief at
Pg. 3, Tfl citing New York v. Green. 420 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2005)). Contrary to River
Crossings' blanket assertion, the federal circuits are split as to whether an "appearance"
requires nominal efforts, such as a mere telephone call, as advocated by River Crossings,
2

Reported as Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings. LLC, 191 P.3d 39 (2008).

3

River Crossings cites to Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966) wherein a
single telephone request for extension by counsel constituted appearance.
3

or whether a party must meet a higher but reasonable threshold and actually prove a
"clear purpose to defend the suit.55 Id. See e.g. Wilson v. Moore & Associates, Inc., 564
F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1977)("informal contacts55 between party and plaintiffs counsel
did not rise to the level of a formal court appearance); Direct Mail Specialist Inc. v. Eclat
Computerized Technologies. Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988)(communication
between counsel did not "rise to the level this court required in Wilson55 for appearance
purposes).
In Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 191 P.3d 39 (Utah Ct. App.
2008) the Utah Court of Appeals supports the long-standing policy that imposes a duty
upon parties to use due diligence when pursuing or defending an action. Such a "brightline455 rule removes ambiguity of the meaning of "appearance55, gives deference to this
Court's construction of the rules of civil procedure and provides a just, expedient and
predictable judicial process.
Furthermore, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure already provide a medium that
protects the "oft-repeated public policy disfavoring default judgments and disposition of
cases on procedural technicalities;555 namely Rule 60(b) motions. Utah courts have
provided ample guidance in determining whether a party may be relieved from a
judgment, default or otherwise. To open Pandora's box further to include questions

4

Id. atn. 9.

5

See Appellant Brief at Pg. 3, f 2.
4

regarding appearance that will require a separate analysis in addition to a Rule 60(b)
analysis will only provide non-diligent parties additional means to protract litigation.
Thus, to avoid a similar situation currently festering in the federal circuits, this
Court now has the opportunity to reconcile the previous holdings in Central Bank & Trust
Co. v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) and Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000),
of which are arguably the only two (2) cases in Utah addressing the issue of "appearance"
under Rule 5(a)(2)(b), and to definitively define the meaning of appearance. Based on
sound public policy considerations, the intent to preserve professional standards, the
avoidance of unnecessary litigation and the arguments presented herein, Arbogast moves
this Court to adopt the position that only a formal appearance (i.e. a formal submission or
presentation to the court) will suffice to trigger notice requirements under Rules 5 and 55
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
II.

Course of Proceedings
A.

District Court Proceedings and Disposition

Appellee adopts Appellant's statement of District Court Proceedings and
Disposition.
B.

Court of Appeals Proceedings and Disposition

Appellee adopts Appellant's statement of Court of Appeals Proceedings and
Disposition.
C.

Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review

Appellee adopts Appellant's statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented
for Review.

ARGUMENT
I.

DUE TO THE SPLIT IN AUTHORITY AND CONFLICTING OPINIONS
IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS, UTAH SHOULD DEFINITIVELY
DEFINE "APPEARANCE" FOR PURPOSES OF RULE 5 AND RULE 55
AS A FORMAL SUBMISSION OR PRESENTATION TO THE COURT.
The issue presented to this Court for review is whether the Utah Court of Appeals

erred in determining that Utah is "among the jurisdictions that require a presentation or
submission to the district court" for purposes of Rules 5(a)(2)(B) and 55(b)(1)(A) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Arbogastl91 P.3d at 46. Contrary to the expressions
made by River Crossings and the Court of Appeals below, such a holding is not simply a
"minority" position. An in-depth review indicates the federal circuit courts are split as to
the meaning of "appearance" and have different thresholds for determining the same. As
such, this Court should affirm the decision in Arbogast and definitively define the
meaning of "appearance," consistent with the plain language of the rule, as a formal
submission or presentation to the court so as to avoid the floods of litigation enveloping
the federal circuit courts.6
Pursuant to Rule 5(a)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "a party in
default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served with all pleadings
and papers." (URCP 5(a)(2)(B) 2009)(emphasis added). If a party fails to appear in an
action, the opposing party is permitted to obtain a default pursuant to Rule 55 of the Utah

6

River Crossings' numerous citations alone evidence the problem created by
broadening the interpretation of appearance.
6

Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rule 55(b)(1)(A) states, "[u]pon request of the
plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the
defendant if: the default of the defendant is for failure to appear." (URCP 55(b)(1)(A)
2009)(emphasis added). "Appearance" has traditionally been defined as "a coming in to
court as a party to a suit, either in person or by an attorney, whether as plaintiff or
defendant." Black's Law Dictionary 38 (2nd Pocket Ed. 2001) See also 10 C. Wright, A.
Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 2686 at 430 (3d. ed. 2008)
("appearance" generally requires a presentation or submission to the court where the
lawsuit is pending). Accordingly, per the language of the rules and the traditional
definition of appearance, if a party fails to appear in an action, said party is not entitled to
be served with copies any pleadings or papers (i.e. no prior notice of default proceedings).
A.

The Seventh Circuit Court Rejects Broad Interpretation Of
"Appearance" Under Rule 55(b)(2) Of The Federal Rules Of Civil
Procedure.

Like Utah, the Seventh (7th) Federal Circuit Court has adopted a bright-line rule
that a formal presentation or submission to the court is required to constitute an
appearance for purposes of providing notice of default proceedings to parties who fail to
"formally" appear in the action. The benchmark case in the 7th Circuit regarding
"appearance" is Zuelzke Tool & Engineering Co.. Inc. v. Anderson Die Castings, Inc.,
925 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1991); See also Town & Country Kids, Inc. v. Protected Venture
Inv. Trust # L i n e . 178 F.R.D. 453, 455 (E.D.Va.1998) (requiring a formal submission to

7

the court)7. In Zuelzke, a default judgment was entered against the defendant for its
failure to file an answer or responsive pleading after being served with the summons and
complaint. Id. at 228. In an attempt to set aside the default judgment, the defendant
sought relief under Rule 60(b). More notably, in an attempt to take a second bite at the
apple, defendant also argued the default judgment was improper for plaintiffs failure to
provide defendant with notice of the default proceedings pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 229.
Similar to Arbogast8 the Zuelzke court found that "informal" settlement
negotiations had taken place between the parties. Id. at 230. The defendant in Zuelzke
argued that these "informal" settlement negotiations constituted appearance under FRCP
Rule 55(b)(2); and in support of such position, referred to several cases that have also
been referenced by River Crossings.9 Id. Despite the defendant's arguments and
considering well-established policy generally disfavoring default judgments, the Zuelzke
court concluded,
Giving plain meaning to its language dictates that a party 'has appeared in the
7

The District Court for the Eastern Division of Virginia is within the jurisdiction
of the 4 Federal Circuit Court and the Town & Country Kids opinion appears to be the
benchmark case from such jurisdictions dealing with the issue of "appearance" under
Rule 55(b)(2).
th

8

See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 41.

9

Particularly, Muiz v. Vidal 739 F. 2d 699 (1st Cir. 1984); H.F. Livermore Corp.
v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F. 2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1970); and Charlton L.
Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center. Inc., 556 F. 2d 308 (5th Cir. 1977).
8

action' under Rule 55(b)(2) only where a party has actually made some
presentation or submission to the district court in the pending action...Moreover, it
is a disservice to the legal system to distort the meaning of a concrete term such as
'appearance' in order to provide a mechanism to save a party from a default
judgment. Efficient court management and reliability of judicial process is
enhanced by court records which disclose the critical procedural actions of the
parties - - such as the entry of an appearance.
Id.
The Zuelzke court further supported its decision by stating,
This minimal formal requirement does not deprive a district judge the opportunity
to grant relief from a default judgment where warranted. If, for example, a
defaulted party is lulled or induced into inaction by settlement discussions and
foregoes filing an appearance and responsive pleading, relief may be sought on the
basis of such conduct under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(1) - - without artificial
reliance on Rule 55(b)(2).
Id. at 23 0-231.
Though River Crossings tries to categorize such approach as "strict" or
"inflexible." However, per the Zuelzke court, such a minimal formal requirement of
filing a formal submission or presentation to the court is not inflexible, strict or unduly
harsh. Trial courts have the ability, if appropriate, to set aside default judgments under
Rule 60(b) if so warranted.10 In fact, Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for such. FRCP 55(c) states, "[t]he court may set aside an entry of default for
good cause, and it may set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b)." (FRCP 55(c)

10

"When an application is made to the court under Rule 55(b)(2) for the entry of
judgment by default, the district judge is required to exercise sound judicial discretion in
determining whether the judgment should be entered." 10 A. Wright, A. Miller & M.
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 2685 (3d. ed. 2008).
9

2009); See also Collex, Inc. v. Walsh. 394 F. Supp. 225, 227 (E.D. Penn. 1975)(Rule
60(b) controls after judgment by default is entered).
Furthermore, as specifically noted in the body of the opinion by the Zuelzke court,
such a formal requirement provides "[e]fficient court management and reliability of
judicial process..." Zuelzke, 925 F.2d at 230; See also Arbogastl91 P.3d at 45 quoting 10
James Wm. Moore et al, Moore's Federal Practice, § 55.33[4][b] (3d. ed. 2008)(cThe
Seventh Circuit has the better linguistic and practical argument"). The Arbogast court
also recognized this ancillary benefit by stating,
Because the court clerk is authorized to enter default judgment under rule 55 only
if the party is in default for failure to appear and the other requirements are met,
see Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b), one of the benefits of the minority position is that it
creates a bright-line test that the clerk can use when determining whether or
not default is appropriate.
See Arbogast 191 P.3d at n. 9. (emphasis added).
Despite the recognition by 7th Federal Circuit Court and the Utah Court of Appeals
of such a benefit, River Crossings is concerned that by adopting such approach, "[t]he
clerk cannot determine with certainty whether default is appropriate even under the
minority approach." (See Appellant Brief at Pg. 15,11). Contrary to River Crossings'
concern, under such a formal approach, the clerk absolutely and easily determines with
certainty whether default, under the clerk's limited authority provided by URCP Rule 55,
is appropriate.
Moreover, it is not, and should not be, the clerk's responsibility to determine

10

whether "extensions] of time" to file responsive pleadings have been agreed upon by the
parties or to determine whether one party was lulled into non-action by representations
made by an opposing party, to name just a few examples. If the default of the defendant
is for failure to appear, if the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person, if the
defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1), or if the claim against the
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation, the
clerk has the authority11 to enter the default. See URCP 60(b). If there is good cause to
set the default aside, Rule 60 provides the very medium in which to do so. At which the
point, the court, not the clerk, will make an appropriate determination whether such relief
is merited.12
In the case sub judice, River Crossings never made a formal submission or
presentation to the trial court. Upon review of the record, the clerk was able to readily
determine that River Crossings had been properly served with the summons and
11

It is important to note that such authority is not discretionary. The official court
record dictates whether the clerk enters default or not. If the record indicates that service
of the summons and complaint has been realized and the party has failed to file a formal
pleading with the court in response thereto, the entry of a default by the clerk is
warranted.
12

There is ample Utah case law on the appropriate standards courts must adopt in
determining whether to grant or deny relief sought under Rule 60(b). See State v.
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983)(a district court should exercise its discretion in
favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities.); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544
P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) (...the courts generally tend to favor granting relief from default
judgments where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party.)(emphasis added).
11

complaint. See Arbogastl91 P.3d at 41. Upon application for default by Arbogast, the
clerk was also able to determine that River Crossings had failed to appear in the action
due to the fact that the record was void of a responsive pleading to Arbogast's complaint.
Id. Accordingly, the default was entered by the clerk. Id. After receiving notice of the
default, River Crossings moved the district court for relief from judgment under Rule
60(b). Id.
However, the district court found that "[River Crossings'] actions and inactions in
this matter d[id] not rise to the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or
mistake." This finding by the trial court was affirmed in Arbogast. Id. at 47. River
Crossings, nor a party who has failed to appear, should not be able to protract further
litigation by then asking the trial court to conduct an additional analysis separate to that of
a Rule 60(b) analysis. An analysis under Rule 60(b) for a party's failure to appear, rather
than under Rule 55, is all encompassing and avoids a "yeah, but..." mentality; which
mentality contradicts the policy and purpose of the rules and precludes the just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of cases.13
The 7th Federal Circuit's approach of requiring formal submissions or
presentations to the trial court gives plain meaning to the actual language of the rules and
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In Wilson v. Moore & Associates. Inc., 564 F.2d 366, 367 (9th Cir. 1977) the
court acknowledged and seemingly questioned the fact that the defendant did not even
plea mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) - - "[rjather, [the] debate centered
solely upon the alleged failure of the plaintiff to comply with the notice requirements of
Fed.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)...".
12

should be definitively required by this Court. "It would have been an easy task to draft
the rule to specifically state that notice of a default hearing is always required, yet this
was not done. The language chosen evidences an intent to impose a notice requirement
only in limited circumstances." North Cent. Illinois Laborers' Dist. Council v. S.J. Groves
& Sons Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1988). Likewise, the language chosen by this
Court in adopting the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should be plainly interpreted to
require a formal submission or presentation to the court for "appearance" purposes under
URCPRules5and55.
B.

The Third Federal Circuit Court Follows The Seventh Federal Circuit
Court And Requires More Than Settlement Negotiations To Constitute
Appearance Under Rule 55(b)(2) Of The Federal Rules Of Civil
Procedure.

Contrary to assertions made by River Crossings, the 7th Federal Circuit is not alone
in refusing to interpret the phrase "appeared in an action" so broadly so as to wholly
eviscerate the appearance requirement of Rule 55(b)(2). The 3rd Federal Circuit court
also requires "some presentation or submission to the court." Port-Wide Container Co. v.
Interstate Maintenance Corp.. 440 F.2d 1195 (3rd Cir. 1971). In Port-Wide, a default
judgment was entered against the defendant for its failure to file a submission or
presentation to the court. Id. at 1196. In fact, the Port-Wide facts are not too different
from the facts sub judice.
The Port-Wide court found that "over a period of many months after the filing of
the complaint there were many oral and some written communications between counsel
13

for the parties with a view to settlement." Id. at 1196. It was further found that after the
settlement efforts proved futile, the plaintiffs attorney sent defendant's attorney a letter
stating, in material part,
Kindly file your answer in the above matter by March 6, 1971. If the answer is not
filed by that time I will seek a default. As you know, the Complaint was filed well
over six months ago.
Id.
This letter in Porte-Wide, although similar to the June 29, 2006 letter provided by
Arbogast to River Crossings,14 is vastly distinct from the Arbogast letter. Although the
Arbogast letter did not use the exact language used in the Porte-Wide letter ("If the
answer is not filed by that time I will seek a default.55) it was nonetheless received by
River Crossings and the clear implication of default was present. See Arbogast 191 P.3d at
41 and n. 15. Whereas in Porte-Wide, the defendant never received the letter from
plaintiff. Id.
Despite never receiving this final letter from plaintiff, the Port-Wide court held
that "...participation in such negotiation[s] did not amount to an appearance in this
action..." and the denial by the lower court of defendant's motion to vacate was affirmed.

14

Counsel for Arbogast sent a letter to River Crossings's counsel on June 29, 2006
wherein it states in material part, "My client has previously granted your client an
extension of time within which to answer the complaint. However, given the present state
of the case, I am, on behalf of my client, hereby requesting that your client file an Answer
to the complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter.55 See Arbogast 191 P.3d
at 41-42.
14

Id. The standard adopted by the 3rd Federal Circuit requiring a formal submission or
presentation to the court still applies today. Therefore, based on sound legal reasoning
opined by the 7th and 3rd Federal Circuit courts and in order to avoid superfluous
interpretation of the rule, this Court should definitively define "appearance" to mean a
formal submission or presentation to the court.
C.

The Ninth and Eighth Federal Circuit Courts Differ From Other
Circuits That Allow A More Broad Interpretation Of "Appearance"
Under Rule 55(b)(2) Of The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure By
Requiring That A Certain Higher Threshold Be Met.

River Crossings asserts the 8th and 9th Federal Circuits are also among the courts
that allow "liberal" interpretation of the meaning of "appearance" regardless of how
nominal the contacts by defendant may be. See Appellants Brief at Pg. 9,1ftj 2-3. This
assertion is not accurate. The benchmark case in regards to implementing a higher
standard in order to constitute an "appearance" despite the failure to formally file a
submission or presentation to the court is Wilson v. Moore & Associates, Inc., 564 F.2d
366(9 th Cir. 1977).
In Wilson, a default judgment was entered against the defendant for its failure to
file a formal submission or presentation to the court. Id. Default judgment was entered
despite the fact that defendant had written two letters to plaintiff contesting the
allegations. Id. Although the Wilson court recognized that "[i]n limited situations,
informal contacts between the parties have sufficed when the party in default has thereby
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demonstrated a clear purpose to defend the suit15/' the court was "unwilling to hold that
Moore's 'informal contacts' constituted the equivalent of a formal court appearance
requiring strict 55(b)(2) notice in circumstances such as these..." Id. at 369. As a result,
the proper, bright-line threshold was imposed upon defaulting parties in the 9th Federal
Circuit.
This higher, easily-determinable, threshold was imposed despite the recognition
that other federal circuits had determined that similar communications would constitute
an "appearance" for notice purposes. Despite such other holdings, the 9th Federal Circuit
declined to follow suit. See Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized
Technologies, Inc., 840 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1988) (the court referenced the Wilson opinion
and stated, "this court noted H.F. Livermore but declined to follow it..."). There are
serious doubts and concerns supporting the rationale and policy behind allowing a
defaulting party to use only nominal efforts that amount to nothing more than delay and
avoidance of plain and easily-followed procedural guidelines.
On the flip side, a plaintiff in a matter is required to strictly adhere to the
procedural guidelines in order to bring a cause of action against a defendant. There are a
large number of rules that work together to ensure that a defendant receives fair notice of
claims being filed against it. For example, URCP Rule 3 requires a plaintiff to actually
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Quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F. 2d
689 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
16

file a complaint. URCP Rule 4 requires the plaintiff to serve the complaint with a
summons in a specified manner. Moreover, Rule 4 requires the use of certain language
and it requires a definite time frame in which to serve the complaint and summons.
Additionally, URCP Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to provide the defendant with a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and that
a demand for judgment is being sought. Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to be simple, concise,
and direct in its pleading. Without being redundant, the rules of civil procedure ensure
that the rights of plaintiffs and defendants are protected and that neither party is unduly
prejudiced.16 Additionally, URCP Rule 12(a) requires a defendant to "serve an answer
within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the
state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is complete
outside the state," so too should this Court. In accordance with the 7th and 3rd Circuits and
similar too, but just one step ahead of, the rationale of the 8th and 9th Circuits, the term
"appearance" should be definitively defined to mean a formal submission or presentation
to the court.

16

From a limited review of the applicable case law, it appears that none of the
courts referenced herein nor in the brief of Appellant, have discussed the issue of whether
an "informal appearance" triggers the requirements of a defendant under Rule 12(b).
17

D.

The Second Federal Circuit Court Is Undecided On The Issue Of The
Meaning Of Appearance Under Rule 55(b)(2) Of The Federal Rules Of
Civil Procedure.17

Again, contrary to the assertion of River Crossings, the 2nd Federal Circuit
undoubtedly recognizes the conflicting opinions through the federal circuit regarding the
meaning of "appearance" under FRCP 55(b)(2). In River Crossings' brief, it referenced
the 2nd Federal Circuit case of New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2005) for the
proposition that the 2nd Federal Circuit had held that "a party need merely indicate 'a clear
purpose to defend the suit' to satisfy the appearance requirement under the federal rules."
See Appellants Brief at Pg. 8, ^ 2. The New York court made no such finding.
On the contrary, the New York court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny
the defendant motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). In so
doing, the New York court stated, the "[cjircuits are divided on whether anything less
than a formal appearance is necessary to actuate the notice requirement of Rule
55(b)(2)."18 Id. atl05. The New York court then went on to reference the bench mark
opinions for both ends of the spectrum; H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft
Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F. 2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(informal appearance with clear intent to
defend suffice) and Zuelzke Tool & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Anderson Die Castings, Inc.,
17

It also appears from in depth review of applicable federal case law, the 10th and
11th Federal Circuits have yet to issue an opinion on the subject matter sub judice.
18

The New York court did recognize that the view of courts that have found
"appearance" to be less then filing a formal submission or presentation to the court but
have indicated a clear purpose to defend the suit is the "prevailing view." Id. at 105.
18

925 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1991)(formal submission to the court required).
Immediately subsequent to these references, the New York court states, cc[w]e find
it unnecessary in this case to resolve this issue." The New York court further states,
"Therefore, even if an informal appearance would entitle a party to advance notice under
Rule 55(b)(2) - - and we expressly do not decide that issue - - [defendant's
communications with the State in this case did not rise to the level of an "appearance"
under Rule 55(b)(2) even under the most liberal construction of the term." Id. at 106.
(emphasis added). The New York court concluded its opinion on the issue by stating,
a

[i]n sum, even assuming (though not deciding) that in appropriate circumstances an

"informal" appearance might suffice19 to trigger the notice of requirements of Rule
55(b)(2), [defendants did not informally appear in this action..." Id. at 107 (emphasis
added).
With even the federal circuit courts recognizing the division and conflict now
occurring in the federal courts in regards to the meaning of "appearance", this Court has
the opportunity to preempt any such division or confusion from infiltrating Utah courts.
This Court should definitively define that "appearance" for Rules 5 and 55 purposes
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The New York court did reference, as did River Crossings, and compare the 6th
Federal Circuit opinion of Lutomski v. Panther Valley Coin Exchange, 653 F.2d 270 (6th
Cir. 1981) wherein the Lutomski court did find that two (2) extensions of time to answer
the complaint provided by plaintiff to defendant were sufficient to constitute appearance.
However, neither New York nor River Crossings mentioned that the case was "reversed
insofar as it denies defendants the opportunity to reopen the question of damages, and the
case is remanded for a hearing on that issue." Lutomski at 271.
19

requires parties to file a formal submission or presentation to the court; thereby
supporting the language of well-established procedural rules and avoiding contradictions
of sound policy to give plain meaning to the rules. Such an interpretation will prevent
future litigation regarding the determination of what additional contacts or statements
constitute an "appearance" under a liberal interpretation of the rules.
H.

WELL-ESTABLISHED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE
UNDERLYING POLICIES DEVELOPED THROUGH NUMEROUS UTAH
DECISIONS ANALYZING SUCH RULES MANDATE ADHERENCE TO
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE AND APPLICATION OF THE PROCEDURAL
RULES.
Although there exists a general policy to try to minimize the entry of default

judgments and dispose of cases on their merits, there are times when the entry of default
is appropriate. Rule 55(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure succinctly states, cc[u]pon
request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs
against the defendant if: the default of the defendant is for failure to appear." (URCP
55(b) 2009)(emphasis added). Rule 5(a)(2)(b) also succinctly states, cca party in default
for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served with all pleadings and
papers." (URCP 5(a)(2)(b) 2009)(emphasis added). As argued supra, "appearance" is
traditionally defined as a coming into court or the filing of a formal submission or
presentation to the court. Thus, by the very language of the rules, if a party fails to
"appear," the clerk may file the entry of default and the defaulting party is not entitled to
notice of the same.

20

The United States Supreme Court states, "[i]t is 'a cardinal principle of statutory
construction5 that 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.'"
TRW Inc. v.Andrews. 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker. 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001)). Anything less than a coming into court or the filing of a formal submission
or presentation to the court would render the word "appear" superfluous, void [or
voidable] and insignificant.20
A.

Rule 60 Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure Expects Parties
Affected By The Application Of Other Rules To Seek Relief
Thereunder; And Consequently, Supports Plaint Interpretation Of The
Language In The Rules.

If a party is unjustly affected by the requirements of the rules of civil procedure, a
medium is provided wherein such a party may seek relief from such adverse impact. The
rules clearly anticipate judgments will be entered for a party's failure to appear.
Accordingly, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect...55 (URCP 60(b)(1) 2009)(emphasis added). In order to
ensure the general policy of avoiding default judgments is adhered to, the underlying

20

In addition, such a finding would render Rule 4(c)(1) void as such rule states,
"[the summons] shall state the time within which the defendant is required to answer the
complaint in writing, and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so,
judgment by default will be rendered against the defendant." (URCP 4(c)(1) 2009).
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theory of the general policy is embedded in the very language of the rule. To reason that
any rule, or any deviation therefrom, is for any other purpose but for the furtherance of
justice is purblind.
Although the plain language of "appearance" requires a party to formally file a
submission or presentation to the court and fails to do so resulting in default, the party is
given a life preserver under Rule 60(b). District courts then have broad discretion in
deciding whether to set aside a default judgment based on facts presented by the
defaulting party. See Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). However, such
discretion is not unlimited as the district court's ruling must be based on "adequate
findings of fact" and "on the law." See Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277, 279 (Utah 2000).
Therefore, the district court must adequately determine whether the party's actions rise to
the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake, or one of the other
justifications specified by Rule 60(b).
Although there is ample case law restating the rale which sets forth the standards
required to set aside a default judgment, there is very little case law actually defining
those standards. The Utah Supreme Court attempted to define "excusable neglect" by
stating, "[w]e have heretofore defined 'excusable neglect' as the exercise of 'due
diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc.
v. Industrial Commission. 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987).
In Black's Title Inc. v. State Ins. DepU 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the
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Black's Title court clarified the meaning of "due diligence" by stating that, "to
demonstrate that the default was due to excusable neglect, 'the movant must show that he
has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over
which he had no control.'" Quoting Airkem Intermountain, Inc v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429,
431 (Utah 1973) (emphasis added).
The primary concern for almost every court that has adopted the open-ended
meaning of "appearance" is to "...protect those parties who, although delaying in a formal
sense by failing to file pleadings within the twenty-day period, have otherwise indicated
to the moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit." H.F. Livermore, 432 F.2d at 691.
Rule 60(b) satisfies this concern. If a party has indeed exercised due diligence so as to
rise to the level of excusable neglect, mistake or surprise, the district court is required to
apply the law;21 and, if appropriate, should set aside the default judgment.22
River Crossings argues that such a following of the rules of civil procedure
disavows or undermines the policy of trying cases on the merits. Again, this is not so.
Adherence to the rules actually supports such policy. If a party wishes to enter settlement
negotiations with the purpose of minimizng time and expense and are lulled into non21

Particular to note, the vast majority of courts that have found informal contacts
to constitute appearance have also found that the district court abused its discretion in
denying motions to set aside default judgments under Rule 60(b). See Key Bank of Maine
v. Tablecloth Textile Co. Corp.. 74 F.3d 349 (1st Cir. 1996)("[t]he district court abused its
discretion when it denied [ajppellanf s motion to set aside default judgment.")
22

See Cannon 3, Chapter 12 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice

(2009).
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action by the opposing party, recourse is provided under Rule 60(b).23 See Zuelzke» 925
F.2d at 231. To render the language of the rules superfluous simply to save the nominal
expense of filing an answer is not the solution and is likely to ultimately increase the costs
of litigation.
Furthermore, a bright-line approach requiring the filing of a formal submission or
presentation to the court is clearly not for the purpose of making life easier on the court
clerks as River Crossings suggests. The Arbogast court did not say as much nor is that
the argument contained herein. The Arbogast court opines that such a "bright-line"
approach provides parties with a clear understanding of what is expected of them upon
being served with a summons and complaint. Id. See URCP 4(c)(1). How parties conduct
themselves after proper service of the summons and complaint is entirely up to them.
Thus, although such policy is not as liberal as River Crossings would like, such policy is
definite, unbiased, fair and imposes a duty upon the parties to act diligently lest suffer
consequences.
III.

THE DECISIONS RENDERED IN CENTRAL BANK AND LUND ARE
CONSISTENT WITH THE FORMAL APPROACH.
There is simply no confusion of the opinion of the Central Bank court in regards to
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See Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982)("[i]t is well
settled that in obtaining a default judgment an attorney may not engage in deceitful or
misleading conduct designed to lull a non-answering party into a false sense of security,
without running the risk of having the default judgment set aside." E.g., Helgesen v.
Invaneumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981).
24

the interpretation of appearance under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
Central Bank & Trust, 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982), the defendants not only had multiple
contacts with the plaintiffs, but also specifically discussed the complaint with plaintiffs5
counsel and indicated that they intended to defend by entering a special appearance. See
Central Bank, 656 P.2d at 1010-1011. Despite recognizing that such communications
were held between the parties, the Central Bank court states, in reference to Rule 5 and
77, "...both of those rules expressly exclude parties in default from those entitled to
notice." Central Bank thereby concluded, "...that plaintiff was under no duty to notify
defendants of the default and that the trial court correctly rejected the argument that there
was such a duty."
Based on an accurate reading of Central Bank, the Arbogast court interpreted the
opinion correctly and appropriately held that River Crossings had not appeared in the case
sub judice. To suggest the Central Bank court.rendered an opinion "without any
independent research, discussion or analysis" or otherwise ignored their judicial
responsibilities to use sound discretion when applying the law is without reason and is
nothing more than a critical self-serving statement. River Crossings then suggests the
Central Bank court missed or ignored alleged "unethical procedural maneuvers" used by
the plaintiff in obtaining default.
Contrary to River Crossings' assertion, the Central Bank court specifically
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addressed such concern.24 Specifically, the Central Bank court found, "there are no acts
alleged on the part of Central Bank's counsel, up to and including the time default
judgment was entered, that could reasonably have led the Jensens or their attorney to
believe that it would be unnecessary to file an answer..." Id. at 1012. Therefore, to
construe the Central Bank holding requires a formal appearance before the court to
constitute appearance for purposes of URCP Rules 5 and 55 is accurate and proper.
Further, in Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000), the defendants filed an action
to foreclose a mechanic's lien they had filed on the plaintiffs property. In response to the
action, the plaintiffs filed an answer and counterclaim of their own. Subsequently, before
replies were due to the plaintiffs counterclaim, the defendants filed for bankruptcy and
did not file a responsive pleading to the counterclaim. Id.
Subsequently, counsel for the plaintiffs sought a default judgment against the
defendants for failing to reply to the counterclaim. The trial court granted the plaintiffs
their requested relief and entered a default judgment against the defendants. Id. On
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the default judgment for this reason: the
defendants were "...sufficiently excused...from replying to the Browns' counterclaim
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See Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982)(c'[i]t is well
settled that in obtaining a default judgment an attorney may not engage in deceitful or
misleading conduct designed to lull a non-answering party into a false sense of security,
without running the risk of having the default judgment set aside."
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under rule 60(b). In addition, Lund and B&B have shown a meritorious defense2:) to the
counterclaim." Id. at 284.
The Lund court made a clear classification of parties in default; (1) parties who are
in default and who have appeared; and (2) parties who are in default and who have not
appeared. Id. at 282. Although the Lund court did reference federal case law that
recognizes the more liberal approach for "appearance" purposes, and even found it to be
"persuasive", it did not adopt the liberal standard. It would have been easy for the Lund
court to include one sentence disavowing the Central Bank holding. It did not.
Lund states, "in Central Bank & Trust, the defaulting party never made an
appearance prior to having default judgment entered against him" while all the while
recognizing that an appearance was formally entered in its own case. Id. at 282-283.
What is more, the Lund court supported a strict reading of the rules of civil procedure by
stating, "[mjoreover, were we to apply Central Bank & Trust's holding to all motions for
default, we would render meaningless the provisions in URCP Rules 5 and 55 requiring
notice of a motion for default in particular categories of cases." Id. Particularly, the
Lund court was referring to Rule 5(a)(2)(b), "a party in default for any reason other than
for failure to appear shall be served with all pleadings and papers." (emphasis added).
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State v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983) held, "In order for defendant to
be relieved from the default judgment, he must not only show that the judgment was
entered against him through excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in Rule 60,
but he must also show that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and that he
has a meritorious defense to the action." Id. at 1056.
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Thus, pursuant to this reading, the Lund court did in fact delve into the depths of
what constitutes an appearance under Rule 5(a). With references to both URCP Rules 55
and 5, it specifically affirmed the holding in Central Bank. Lund specifically states,
"[ajccordinly, we distinguish Centeral Bank & Trust's holding from the instant case
wherein Lund and B&B made an appearance." Id. The federal opinions referenced in
Lund appear to be nothing more that guidance when courts analyze Rule 60 and the
underlying questions associated therewith. Without the Lund court expressly stating
otherwise is pure speculation. It appears from both Central Bank and Lund, Utah has in
fact adopted the policy to give plain meaning to the language of the rules of civil
procedure26 and requires that parties file a formal submission or presentation to the court
to constitute appearance for purposes of Rule 5 and 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Therefore, pursuant to Lund and Central Bank, River Crossing did not file a formal
appearance and fell within the classification of a party who was in default and who had
not appeared. As the district court, of which was affirmed by the appellate court, did not
find that River Crossings' actions rose to the level of excusable neglect under well
established case law precedent, it was accurately determined that notice was not required
to be provided to River Crossings.
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Including, but not limited to, Rules 3, 4, 5, 8, 12 and 60 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
28

IV. THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DO NOT RUN AFOUL OF
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE.
Knowing the identity of an opposing party is distinctly different from formally
appearing in an action by filing a formal submission or presentation to the court. Rule 14301(16) of the Utah Rules of Professional Practice states,
Lawyers shall not cause the entry of default without first notifying other counsel
whose identity is known, unless their clients' legitimate rights could be adversely
affected, (emphasis added).
River Crossings fails to acknowledge the key language in the rule. The keystone
of the rule is the lawyer moving for default must know to whom notice is to be given.
When counsel moves for default for the opposing party's failure to appear under Rules 5
and 55, there exists a strong probability that counsel is not aware of the identity of other
counsel, if any. Now, if a party has failed to "appear" pursuant to the rules of civil
procedure and nevertheless made himself known to the moving party by any form, then
admittedly, the moving counsel must first notify the other counsel prior to doing so to
remain in compliance with Rule 14-301(16). Such a requirement simply intends to
diminish the number of defaults filed upon parties who may have a valid reason to later
allege excusable neglect, surprise or mistake under Rule 60.
Contrary to assertions made by River Crossings, counsel for Arbogost complied
with both the rules of civil procedure and the rules of professionalism and civility. As
found in Arbogast there was some discussion between counsel for Arbogast and River
Crossings that Arbogast would first provide notice prior to seeking default. See
29

Arbogast 191 P.3d at 41. Accordingly, prior to filing for default, Arbogast's counsel
provided River Crossings with written advance notice27 that it was time to file an answer
to Arbogast's complaint. Id. Arbogast can not be held responsible for River Crossings5
counsel's negligence and failure to exercise due diligence. River Crossings could have
responded or at least contacted counsel for Arbogast for clarity, if any were needed, to the
June 29, 2006 Letter.
As held in Black's Title, "because this neglect was caused by Black's failure to
exercise due diligence, it was not to be excused." See Black's Title at 611. Similarly,
River Crossings, nor any other party, should not be excused from judgment on account of
attorney neglect and failure to exercise due diligence and should certainly not be excused
by attempting to blame opposing counsel for the same. This would not be sound policy
under either approach.
V.

RULE 55(b)(2) OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS
DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT FROM RULE 55(b)(2) OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Although the Utah courts may look to the federal courts for guidance, FRCP

55(b)(2) and URCP 55(b)(2) are distinctly different from one another. Rule 55(b)(2) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states,
In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court
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The June 29, 2006 letter specifies and generally gives twenty (20) days prior
notice. Moreover, Arbogast actually waits a total of thirty-two (32) days before finally
submitting the default pleadings.
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therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect,
it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper.
Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states,
In all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default judgment. A
default judgment may be entered against a minor or incompetent person only if
represented by a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary who has
appeared. If the party against whom a default judgment is sought has
appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its representative
must be served with written notice of the application at least 3 days before the
hearing. The court may conduct hearings or make referrals — preserving any
federal statutory right to a jury trial — when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it
needs to: (A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C)
establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other
matter, (emphasis added).
As emphasized above, FRCP Rule 55(b)(2) is readily distinguishable from URCP
55(b)(2). URCP 55 makes no mention of appearance and a fortiori, is void of any
language requiring a party to give at least 3 days notice before a hearing regarding
default. It would have been an easy task to draft the Utah rule to specifically include such
language; however it did not. FRCP 55 seems to mandate a hearing in regards to the
default and mandates 3-day advance written notice of the same to a party who has
appeared. URCP 55 has no such requirement. Therefore, analogies of URCP 55 to
FRCP 55 is tenuous at best and may be directly off-point.
More particularly, the FRCP 55 (3-day advance written notice) requires a shot
across the bow. Whereas under URCP 5 (the rule dealing with providing copies and/or
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notice) the opposing party only gets copies of the pleadings filed with the court. By the
time the opposing party receives the certificate of default and accompanying pleadings, it
is highly likely that the opposing party's default has already been entered. The opposing
party is then left to seek recourse under Rule 60(b).
In the case at hand, River Crossings5 default would have already been entered even
if a copy of the certificate of default had been mailed it. River Crossings lost its Rule
60(b) arguments in both the district court and appellate court levels. Thus, the result of
sending copies of the default pleadings would not have changed the outcome.
VI.

IF THIS COURT IS INCLINED TO ADOPT A MORE LIBERAL VIEW OF
APPEARANCE FOR PURPOSES OF RULES 5 AND 55(b)(2), THIS
COURT SHOULD FIND THAT ARBOGAST COMPLIED WITH RULE
55(b)(2) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Although the Arbogast court rejects the district court's finding that River

Crossings had appeared to some degree so as to require notice, both the district court and
Arbogast court recognize that Arbogast did provide notice of default to River Crossings
through the June 29, 2006 letter. The June 29, 2006 letter sent to River Crossings states
in material part,
My client has previously granted your client an extension of time within which to
answer the complaint. However, given the present state of the case, I am, on
behalf of my client, hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter, (emphasis added).
The fact that the June 29, 2006 letter was sent by Arbogast and received by River
Crossings is undisputed. However, River Crossings contends that because the language of
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the letter did not actually use the word "default/5 it was not actually provided notice of
the same. Recognizing such claim, the trial court addressed River Crossings5 counsel at
the hearing on the Rule 60(b) motion and stated the following, "Counsel, doesn't that
somewhat imply that? I mean, my reading of the letter, that's the way I look at it, quite
frankly. So..." (R. at 185 at Pg. 26 ^j 8-10). In response to the trail court's comments,
River Crossings' counsel responded by saying, "Well, the implication is there"as he
continued to argue the issue of mistake of rules under Rule 60(b). (R. at 185 at Pg. 26 Y(|
11-21). At the appellate level, the Arbogast court recognized and eluded to such
colloquy. See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 48.
For purposes of Rule 55(b)(2), not only did Arbogast give more than three (3) days
prior written notice of its intention to pursue default proceedings, it provided River
Crossings more than thirty (30) days from the date of this written notice; as it did not file
for default until July 31, 2006. Arbogast did, in fact, provide River Crossings with
advance written notice of the default. C.f. Porte-Wide Container Co. v. Interstate
Maintenance Corp.. 440 F.2d 1195 (3rd Cir. 1971)(even though defendant never received
a letter sent by plaintiff, of which letter was quite similar to the Arbogast letter, the court
held "this circumstance did not make it inequitable for plaintiffs attorney, who had
properly given notice of his intention, to proceed in accordance with the rules governing
default."). Thus, even under the most liberal definition of the term "appearance," River
Crossings should not be relieved of its default.

It would be inequitable to Arbogast should the Court decide to liberally interpret
the meaning of appearance under URCP 555 while strictly interpreting the notice
requirement under URCP 5 (the mailing of all pleadings). As such, the June 29, 2006
letter from Arbogast to River Crossings should satisfy the notice requirements of URCP 5
when applying a liberal interpretation of the same. Thus, even under a liberal approach
River Crossings should not be relieved from default.
VIL

IF THIS COURT IS INCLINED TO ADOPT A MORE LIBERAL VIEW OF
APPEARANCE FOR PURPOSES OF RULES 5 AND 55(b)(2), THIS
COURT SHOULD FURTHER FIND THAT RIVER CROSSINGS FAILED
TO INDICATE A CLEAR PURPOSE TO DEFEND THE SUIT.
Should this Court find the holdings of the federal courts that adopt a more liberal

view of "appearance" persuasive, this Court should then also find that a party has
indicated a clear purpose to defend the suit. See Wilson, 564 F.2d at 369 (comparing HJF.
Livermore's requirement of demonstrating a clear purpose to defend the suit.). Here,
River Crossings did not indicate a clear purpose to defend the suit. The Arbogast court
states in n. 7,
Even if Utah has adopted this standard, it is questionable whether River Crossings'
actions actually indicated "a clear purpose to defend the suit." See New York v.
Green, 420 F.3d 99, 105 (2nd Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks omitted).
Although River Crossings participated in multiple settlement discussions, it did so
through Nevada counsel; it does not appear that River Crossings obtained Utah
counsel - - a necessary step for defending a lawsuit in Utah - - until after the
default judgment had been entered. See generally Utah Supreme Court rules of
Prof 1 Practice R. 14-802 ("[0]nly persons who are active, licensed members of
the Bar in good standing may engage in the practice of law in Utah.").
See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 48, n. 7.
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Even under the liberal view of "appearance. River Crossings' actions did not rise
to such level. Thus, under a liberal approach, River Crossings should not be relieved
from default.
VTIL ATTORNEY FEES
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a] party
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and
set forth the legal basis for such an award." (URAP 24(a)(9) (2007)). "The general rule is
that when a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also
entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 806
P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In the instant case, Arbogast was awarded its attorneys fees and costs at the trial
court level pursuant to the Default Judgment. See R. at 35-36. In addition, Arbogast was
awarded its attorneys fees at the appellate court level. See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 48.
"Generally, attorney fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter of right under a contract or
statute." Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). Here, attorneys fees are a matter of
right under contract pursuant to the trust deed note entered into by the parties and signed
by River Crossings. See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 48. The trust deed note reads in material
part,
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or
interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned...agree to pay all costs and
expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. Id.
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Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the trust deed note, the findings by both the
district court and appellate court and the above arguments, Arbogast is entitled to its
reasonable attorneys fees incurred at the district court level, the appellate court level and
on appeal to this Court.
CONCLUSION
The plain language of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that the
meaning of "appearance" for the purposes of Rules 5 and 55 require a party to file a
formal submission or presentation to the court. This view is based on sound policy, not to
the exclusion thereof, and is consistent with the policy considerations adopted by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such view will provide efficient court management and
reliability of judicial process. For the reasons argued herein, Appellee Arbogast Family
Trust respectfully requests this Court to affirm the decision rendered by the Utah Court of
Appeals and respectfully requests that a reasonable attorney fee be awarded.
DATED this 2 ^

day of February, 2009.
FARRIS & UTLEY, PC

Tyler T. Todd
Attorneys for Appellee Arbogast Family Trust
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dispute was resolved. These funds were eventually
deposited with the trial court.
K 3 On January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a complaint
for declaratory judgment, seeking to obtain the funds held
in escrow. Because River Crossings had previously
informed Arbogast that it was represented by counsel and
because of difficulties serving River Crossings directly,
the trial court granted Arbogast's motion for alternate
service. Accordingly, Arbogast served River Crossings'
Nevada legal counsel, Black, LoBello & Sparks (BLS),
with the complaint.(fhl) Counsel for Arbogast granted
BLS at least two extensions to make a settlement offer, to
seek Utah counsel, or both. According to River
Crossings, counsel for Arbogast men told BLS in June
2006 that he would not seek default without first
notifying it.

This Page Contains Headnotes.
Appeal from the Fifth District, St. George Department,
Eric A. Ludlow, J.

1 4 On June 28, 2006, BLS communicated a
settlement offer to Arbogast's counsel. The next day,
counsel for Arbogast sent a letter to BLS rejecting the
offer. The letter also stated as follows:
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Scott M. Lilja and Nicole M. Deforge, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.
Chad J. Utley nnd Tyler T. Todd, St. George, for
Appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, P J., McHUGH and ORME, JJ.
OPINION
McHUGH, Judge:
If 1 River Crossings, LLC (River Crossings) appeals
the trial court's denial of its rule 60(b) motion to set aside
a default judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
| 2 Arbogast Family Trust (Arbogast) provided River
Crossings a $2,450,000 loan. The loan was to be repaid
with interest by September 16,2005. If repayment was
more than five days late, the loan agreement provided for
"[a] late payment penalty of [s]ix percent." River
Crossings repaid the loan in full on October 7, 2005.
Because the loan was not repaid within five days of
September 16, 2005, Arbogast claimed it was entitled to a
late payment penalty of over $148,000, plus interest.
River Crossings stated that it was granted an extension of
time to repay the loan and therefore contested that it
owed any additional amount. Because of the dispute
between the parties, River Crossings directed that
approximately $178,000 be held in escrow until the

My client has previously granted your client an extension
of time within which to answer the complaint However,
given the 42
present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client,
hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this
letter.
1 5 On June 30, the BLS attorney primarily
responsible for the River Crossings matter was
terminated. However, the June 29 letter was addressed to
two other members of the firm who had taken
responsibility for the case. On July 25, River Crossings'
managing member sent an e-mail to Arbogast's principal.
Although the e-mail requested that Arbogast's principal
call River Crossings' managing member in order to
"discuss the direction of [the] lawsuit," no further
communication occurred. Six days later ~ approximately
four months after service of the complaint and more than
thirty days after the June 29 letter requesting an answer »
Arbogast obtained a certificate of default from the court
clerk. Arbogast did not provide River Crossings a copy of
this certificate or its subsequent request for default
judgment On August 10, the trial judge entered a default
judgment. Notice of the judgment was sent to River
Crossings on August 15.
\ 6 River Crossings filed a rule 60 motion to set aside
the default judgment on September 26, 2006, and
arguments were held February 21, 2007.(fh2) During
arguments, River Crossings' Utah legal counsel

acknowledged that "this is a close case" Counsel also
conceded that a formal appearance had not been entered
and that "[Arbogast] didn't need to give notice [of the
default motions] under Rule 5(2)(a)" In fact, counsel
declared that he was "not claiming that because an
appearance was made notice should have been given "
The trial court determined "that [River Crossings'] actions
and inactions in this matter d[id] not rise to the level of
excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake "
The trial court also found that although BLS did not
formally appear m the action, "counsel's notification and
communications with [ArbogastJ's counsel constitute an
appearance and there was adequate notice
given to
[River Crossings], pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter "
Accordingly, the court denied River Crossings' motion
River Crossings appeals
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
K 7 River Crossings presents three arguments on
appeal First, River Crossings argues that the default
judgment should have been set aside because Arbogast
failed to provide the notice required by rule 5(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "[T]he interpretation of a
rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for
correctness " Brown v Glover, 2000 UT 89, \ 15, 16 P 3d
540
| 8 Second, River Crossings argues that "the district
court abusefd] its limited discretion m refusing to set
aside the default judgment" "[A] trial court has broad
discretion m deciding whether to set aside a default
judgment" Lund v Brown, 2000 UT 75,1f 9, 11 P 3d 277
However, "the court's discretion is not unlimited " Id
K 9 Third, River Crossings argues that the trial court's
"refus[alj to set aside the default judgment [was] based
on faulty findings of fact" This court will reverse a trial
court's factual findmgs only if the marshaled evidence
demonstrates that they are clearly erroneous See
Bingham Consolidation Co v Groesbeck, 2004 UT App
434,1f 14, 105 P 3d 365
ANALYSIS
I Rule 5(a)
f 10 Because of River Crossings' statements before
the trial court and Arbogast's arguments on appeal, we
begin by addressing whether River Crossings' rule 5
arguments were preserved (fii3) l|X [A]s a general rule,
claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised
on appeal'" Tschaggeny v Milbank Ins Co , 2007 UT 37,

opportunity to address the claimed error, and if
appropriate, correct it Second, requiring preservation of
an issue prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial
for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if
the strategy fails
Id (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
K 11 In this case, River Crossings' trial counsel did
very little to raise the rule 5 issue before the trial
court(fh4) and actually made statements during oral
arguments that conflict with its position on appeal
Nevertheless, the trial court specifically considered this
issue and expressly found
[t]hat pursuant to [the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]
Rule 5(a)(2), [River Crossings'] counsel has not formally
appeared m the instant action Nevertheless, [River
Crossings'] counsel's notification and communications
with [ArbogastJ's counsel constitute an appearance and
there was adequate notice [ ] given to [River Crossings],
pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter, that an answer was
required to be filed m response to [ArbogastJ's complaint
The trial court's findmgs do not simply mirror River
Crossings' concessions but instead demonstrate a deeper
analysis, which expressly addresses the application of
rule 5 River Crossings does not challenge the trial court's
finding that an appearance was entered, but rather the
court's legal interpretation of rule 5 as stated in its ruling
Neither of the two policy considerations for the
preservation requirement prevent our review where the
trial court has actually ruled on the issue, and River
Crossings' arguments do not suggest a strategic decision
to postpone review We therefore hold that, under the
facts of this case, this issue is sufficiently preserved for
appellate review (fh5) Cf Pratt v Nelson 2007 UT 41, K
24, 164 P 3d 366 (determining issue was preserved where
trial court received some notice of the issue and "made a
specific ruling on the issue" even though petitioner did
not address it in a timely manner)
\ 12 Having determined that this issue is properly
before us, we turn now to its merits Rule 5(a) declares
that "every judgment, every order
, every pleading
every paper
, every written motion
, and every
written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment,
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the
parties " Utah R Cn P 5(a)(1) The rule "expresses the
general principle that notice of all proceedmgsf, including
default proceedings,] must be provided to all parties "
Lund, 2000 UT 75, fl 20-27, 11 P 3d 277 However,
*'[n]o service need be made on parties in default
for
failure to appear " Utah R Civ P 5(a)(2)
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K 20, 163 P 3d 615 (alteration m original) (quoting State
v Cram 2002 UT 37, % 9, 46 P 3d 230)
Two policy considerations underlie th[is] preservation
rule First, the rule exists to give the trial court an

^ 13 River Crossings argues that the trial court
correctly determined that it had entered an appearance,
but erred when it ruled that "adequate notice was given to
[River Crossings] pursuant to the Tune 29, 2006 letter "
Because we agree with Arbogast's argument that the trial

court erred when it determined that River Crossings had
entered an appearance, we need not address
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River Crossings' contention regarding the sufficiency of
notice.
If 14- Two cases from the Utah Supreme Court have
interpreted rule 5 and addressed what constitutes an
appearance. In Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656
P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982), defense counsel contacted the
plaintiffs counsel after the complaint was filed, advised
counsel that he was representing the defendants, and
discussed the complaint. See id. at 1010. The next day,
defense counsel wrote a letter "requesting copies of the
pleadings and all other documents." Id. The plaintiffs
counsel "answered the letter, refusing to supply
documentation to aid . . . in making a special appearance,
but expressing a willingness to cooperate if [the
defendants] appeared generally." Id. A few weeks later,
the plaintiff obtained a default judgment without
notifying the defendants or serving them under rule 5. See
id; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 5. On appeal, the defendants
argued that the default should be set aside because the
plaintiff "had an obligation under Rule [] 5 . . . to notify"
the defendants. Central Bank & Trust, 656 P.2d at 1011.
The supreme court disagreed, "concluding] that plaintiff
was under no duty to notify defendants of the default,"
id, and subsequently explained that the Central Bank &
Trust defendants "never made an appearance prior to
having default judgment entered against [them]," Lund v.
Brown, 2000 UT 75, 1 27, 11 P.3d 277 (discussing
Central Bank & Trust); see also Central Bank & Trust,
656 P.2d at 1011-12 & n. 2 (emphasizing that "[n]o
service need be made on parties in default for failure to
appear" (emphasis omitted)).
H 15 In Lundv. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277, the
plaintiffs filed a complaint, and the defendants filed an
answer and counterclaim. See id. ^ 3. However, the
plaintiffs never-filed a reply to the counterclaim, and the
defendants obtained default judgment without serving the
plaintiffs with copies of the default papers pursuant to
rule 5. See id. fl 4-5. The plaintiffs appealed the default
judgment, arguing that they were entitled to service under
rule 5. See id. ffi[ 1, 6. The supreme court agreed and
reversed the default judgment.(fii6) See id. % 1. Notably,
the supreme court distinguished Lund from Central Bank
& Trust on the basis that Lund involved a "formal
appearance" while Central Bank & Trust did not. See id.
127.
\ 16 Based on these two supreme court rulings,
Arbogast argues that unless a party enters a formal
appearance through a pleading in the trial court, it has not
appeared and is not entitled to service under rule 5 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Because we believe
Central Bank & Trust and Lund dictate this result, we
agree.

\ 17 To fully understand the import, of Central Bank
& Trust and Lund, it is helpful to examine the manner in
which other jurisdictions, and especially the federal
courts, have interpreted similar rules. See id. (relying on
outside sources). These jurisdictions have adhered to one
of two conflicting positions when determining what
constitutes an appearance.
\ 18 The first, and the majority position, "is that 'the
notice requirement . . .' applies not only to parties who
have formally appeared, but also to'those parties who,
although delaying in a formal sense by failing to file
pleadings within the twenty-day period, have otherwise
indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to defend
the suit.'" New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 105 (2d
Cir.2005)
(quoting
H.F.
Livermore
Corp. v.
Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe,432 F.2d 689, 691
(D.C.Cir.1970) (per curiam)); see also id. (collecting
cases); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142
(5th Cir. 1996) ("What constitutes an appearance is not
confined to physical appearances in
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court or the actual filing of a document in the record."
(internal quotation marks omitted)). River Crossings
argues that Utah has adopted this standard.(m7)
However, if this were truly the standard in Utah, we
believe Central Bank & Trust would have been decided
differently or disavowed by Lund.(fnS)
H 19 In Central Bank & Trust, the defendants not only
had multiple contacts with the plaintiffs, but also
specifically discussed the complaint with plaintiffs'
counsel and indicated that they intended to defend by
entering a special appearance. See Central Bank & Trust
Co. v. Jensen,656 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah 1982). See
generally Barlow v. Cappo,Z2\ P.2d 465, 466 (Utah
Ct.App.1991) ("A special appearance is to contest a
court's personal jurisdiction without submitting oneself to
it."). Nevertheless, the supreme court later determined
that the defendants "never made an appearance." Lund,
2000 UT 75, If 27, 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank
& Trust). Thus, Central Bank & Trust departs from with
the majority rule, which merely requires an indication of
"a clear purpose to defend the suit." See Green, 420 F.3d
at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted).
| 20 On the other hand, the position applied by a
minority ofjurisdictions is consistent with the Utah
Supreme Court's rulings in Central Bank & Trust and
Lund. Under this standard, courts "strictly construe [] the
term 'appearance' to require a party to make "some
presentation or submission to the district court in the
pending action.'" Id. (quoting Zuelzke Tool & Eng'g Co.
v. Anderson Die Castings, Inc., 925 F.2d 226, 230 (7th
Cir. 1991)); accord Plaza del Lago Townhomes Ass'n v.
Highwood Builders, LLC,148 P.3d 367, 370-71
(Colo.Ct.App. 2006); see also Black's Law Dictionary
107 (8th ed.2004) (defining "appearance" as "[a] coming
into court as a party or interested person" (emphasis

added)); 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal
Practice § 55.33[4][b] (3d ed. 2008) ("The Seventh
Circuit has the better linguistic and practical
argument. ").(fh9) Under this standard, the supreme
court's rulings in Central Bank & Trust and Lund are
easily understood. In Central Bank & Trust, the
defendant never made any presentation to the district
court, see 656 P.2d at 1009-10, and thus "never made an
appearance," Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, f 27, 11 P.3d
277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust). In Lund, the
plaintiffs made a presentation to the district court by
filing a complaint and, therefore, were deemed to have
appeared. See id.
K 21 Despite the holdings of Central Bank & Trust
and Lund, River Crossings
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argues that Utah could not have adopted the minority
position because it would be incompatible with Utah's
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. We do not
believe the two are incompatible. The Standards of
Professionalism and Civility require notice before
obtaining default. See Utah Standards of Professionalism
& Civility 16 ("Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a
default without first notifying other counsel whose
identity is known. . . ."). Rule 5, on the other hand,
concerns service at the time of filing. See Utah R. Civ. P.
5. Thus, a party can easily comply with the standards of
civility, even though service is not required under rule 5.
For example, in this case, counsel would have acted in
conformity with the standards of civility, even though he
did not serve the actual papers under rule 5, if he had first
called defense counsel and alerted him that default was
imminent, (fii 10)
122 Although the supreme court has never explicitly
addressed the two competing lines of authority or defined
what constitutes an appearance under rule 5, we believe
the holdings of Central Bank & Trust and Lund place us
among the jurisdictions that require a presentation or
submission to the district court. Because River Crossings'
legal counsel, like the defendants' legal counsel in
Central Bank & Trust, never "ma[d]e some presentation
or submission to the district court," Green, 420 F.3d at
105, we hold that River Crossings never made an
appearance pursuant to rule 5. For these reasons, we
affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue.
II. Rule 60(b)
% 23 River Crossings argues "the district court abused
its discretion in refusing to set a[si]de the default
judgment [because River Crossings] presented a
'reasonable excuse' for failing to file a responsive
pleading." (Capitalization omitted.) Under rule 60(b), a
"court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a part}' or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Although a

trial court has broad discretion when determining whether
to set aside default judgment under rule 60(b), "the
court's discretion is not unlimited." Lund, 2000 UT 75, ^j
9, 11 P.3d 277. Indeed, "the [disfavored] nature of a
default judgment and the equitable nature of rule 60
provide . . . limits." Id. \ 10. Thus, "it is quite uniformly
regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a
default judgment where there is reasonable justification
or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely
application is made to set it aside." Id ^ 11 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In this case, however, we
cannot say the trial court exceeded its discretion.
\ 24 River Crossings presents several arguments that
it claims demonstrate a "good faith, legitimate belief that
no action would or could be taken against them." See id. \
19 (determining such a belief "constitutes a'reasonable
justification or excuse'").(fill 1)
\ 25 First, River Crossings argues that "[b]ased on
[Arbogast's counsel's express representation [] that he
would not initiate default proceedings against River
Crossings without first notifying opposing counsel, River
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Crossings reasonably and justifiably believed that no
action would be taken against it." Arbogast argues that it
made this representation, if at all, only so that River
Crossings would have adequate time to present a
settlement offer or obtain local counsel.(fhl2) Arbogast
further argues that once counsel sent the June 29, 2006
letter rejecting River Crossings' settlement offer and
requesting an answer, it was no longer reasonable for
River Crossings to believe that it need not answer the
complaint. The trial court agreed with Arbogast and
found "[t]hat the contention that [River Crossings']
counsel expected notice prior to the default entry is
unfounded given the express provisions of the June 29,
2006 letter" requesting that an answer be filed
f 26 Second, River Crossings argues that it has a
reasonable excuse for not filing an answer because the
attorney at BLS "who had been responsible for
negotiating and communicating] with [Arbogast] was
discharged, and the attorney who assumed those
responsibilities went on an extended vacation." However,
as the trial court found, the discharged BLS attorney was
removed from the case before the June 29,2006 letter.
Indeed, the June 29 letter was sent to the two lawyers
who had assumed the responsibilities of the discharged
attorney. Moreover, even if one of the replacement
attorneys was on extended vacation, the other attorney
was not. In fact, River Crossings declared to the trial
court that it "dpdjn't want to make a big fact about" the
other lawyer's vacation "because [her colleague] was
aware of what was going on."(fhl3) Despite this
awareness, no answer was filed. Thus, the trial court
found that this "excuse [] . . . d[id] not constitute
excusable neglect, inadvertent surprise or mistake."

K27 Third, River Crossings argues that its "attorneys
believed that settlement negotiations were ongoing."
River Crossings bases this argument primarily on an
e-mail that its managing member sent directly to
Arbogast's principal — but not to Arbogast's counsel. In
that e-mail, River Crossings' managing member simply
stated, "Give me a call when you get a chance. We should
probably discuss the direction of your lawsuit" Even
assuming that the e-mail implied continued settlement
discussions, it was not reasonable to assume that it freed
River Crossings from filing an answer. This is especially
true because the e-mail was not sent by River Crossings'
legal counsel, Arbogast never responded to the e-mail,
and Arbogast had explicitly rejected River Crossings'
settlement efforts and requested an answer in its June 29
letter. Accordingly, the trial court found that River
Crossings failed to exercise due diligence and that it was
this failure that ultimately resulted in the default
judgment.

managing member to Arbogast's principal. Thus, this
finding of fact is not clearly erroneous.(fhl4)
% 31 River Crossings further contests the trial court's
finding that the June 29, 2006 letter informed River
Crossings that Arbogast was requiring an answer within
twenty days. River Crossings argues that because the
letter actually stated that Arbogast "[is] hereby requesting
. . . an Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days,"
the trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous and the ruling
must be reversed. We disagree. Regardless of the
professional and civil tone of the June 29 letter, its
message was clear: Arbogast had rejected River
Crossings' settlement offer and was moving forward with
the litigation. Indeed, River Crossings acknowledged this
plain
implication
during oral
arguments.(fiil5)
Accordingly, the trial court's finding is not clearly
erroneous.
IV. Attorney Fees

U 28 After reviewing River Crossings' arguments, the
facts of the case, and the trial court's rulings, we cannot
say the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion.
River Crossings conceded to the trial court that "this is a
close case." Because "a trial court has [such] broad
discretion" on this issue, Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, H
9, H P . 3 d 2 7 7 , we will not reverse an admittedly, and
demonstrably, "close case." We recognize that default
judgments are generally disfavored, but "[i]n the absence
of an abuse of discretion, we [will] not undertake to
substitute our idea of what is proper for that of the trial
court." G.M. Leasing Corp. v. Murray First Thrift &
Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Utah 1975) (refusing to
substitute judgment on trial court's issuance of sanctions).
Although we might have reached a different conclusion
in the first instance, we affirm the trial court's ruling that
River Crossings did not show reasonable justification or
excuse for its failure to answer.
III. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact
\ 29 River Crossings' final contention is mat the
"district court's refusal to set aside
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the default judgment was based on faulty findings of
fact"
T[ 30 River Crossings argues the trial court incorrectly
found that, other than the June 29,2006 letter, "[t]here
were not any . . . discussions between [Arbogast]'s
counsel and [River Crossings'] counsel between . . . June
29, 2006 and August 18, 2006." However, River
Crossings acknowledges that "the district court's finding
is perhaps technically correct." In fact, the record before
us indicates the trial court's ruling was correct. There is
nothing in the record demonstrating any communication
from River Crossings' legal counsel to Arbogast's legal
counsel during this time period. The only communication
is the July 25 e-mail that was sent from River Crossings'

1 32 River Crossings does not appeal the trial court's
grant of attorney fees to Arbogast, but argues that
Arbogast is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Again,
we disagree.
U 33 The trust deed note provided that "[i]f this note is
collected by an attorney after default in the payment of
principal or interest, either with or without suit, the
undersigned . . . agree to pay all costs and expenses of
collection including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Moreover, the trial court's judgment awarded Arbogast its
attorney fees below. See generally Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald,96l P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (*'[W]hen a
party who received attorney fees below prevails on
appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably
incurred on appeal." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
1[ 34 River Crossings' only argument against an award
of attorney fees on appeal is that "this appeal does not
directly relate to Arbogast's collection efforts." However,
this case directly concerns Arbogast's collection efforts;
Arbogast filed suit to collect the amount it claims it was
owed under the parties' agreement. Because this case
concerns Arbogast's collection efforts and because
Arbogast was awarded its attorney fees below, we
remand to the trial court for a determination of the
reasonable attorney fees Arbogast incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
H 35 We affirm the trial court's denial of River
Crossings' rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default
judgment and remand for a determination of the attorney
fees Arbogast incurred on appeal.
H 36 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Presiding Judge and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.

Footnotes:
FN1. River Crossings' counsel on appeal did not
represent River Crossings during any of the proceedings
in the trial court.
FN2. By this time, River Crossings had hired a Utah
law firm to represent it before the trial court.
FN3. Our inquiry is made more difficult by River
Crossings' failure to provide a "citation to the record
showing that the issue was preserved" as required by rule
24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Utah
R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(A).
FN4. River Crossings argues that it "tirelessly raised
the issue of lack of notice of the default proceedings at
every stage in this litigation." While River Crossings did
address the lack of notice before the trial court, its
arguments focused on whether notice was required
because of Arbogast's assurance that it would not seek
default without first notifying BLS. That issue is distinct
from the issue on appeal, i.e., whether River Crossings
was entitled to notice under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
FN5. We caution that a concession by trial counsel
generally will prevent appellate review. See First Equity
Corp. of Florida v. Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d 887, 892 n.
5 (Utah 1975) ("Ordinarily, an appellant cannot raise a
theory on appeal for the first time different from that
presented to the Court below."); see also Pratt v. Nelson,
2007 UT 41, 117, 164 P.3d 366 ("[A] party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party
led the trial court into committing the error."). However,
this case is unique because the trial court independently
researched, analyzed, and determined the issue at hand,
and that determination is part of the decision on appeal.
FN6. The plaintiffs in Lund actually presented two
arguments on appeal: (1) "[T]hat they were reasonably
justified, for rule 60(b) purposes, in not replying to the
[defendants' counterclaim" and
(2) "that the
[defendants' failure to notify them of the default motion
justifies their failure to respond." Lund v. Brown, 2000
UT 75, K 14, 11 P.3d 277. The supreme court found
sufficient justification to reverse based solely on the first
issue. See id. H 20. The court then addressed the second
argument "to clarify the requirements of the procedural
rules." Id. The court determined there was "additional
justification" for reversal based on the defendants' failure
to comply with rule 5. Id.
FN7. Even if Utah had adopted this standard, it is
questionable whether River Crossings' actions actually
indicated "a clear purpose to defend the suit." See New
York v.Green, 420 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir.2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although River Crossings
participated in multiple settlement discussions, it did so
through its Nevada counsel; it does not appear that River
Crossings obtained Utah counsel — a necessary step for

defending a lawsuit in Utah — until after the default
judgment had been entered. See generally Utah Supreme
Court Rules of Prof 1 Practice R. 14-802 ("[0]nly persons
who are active, licensed members of the Bar in good
standing may engage in the practice of law in Utah.").
FN8. The supreme court did acknowledge in Lund
that "[a] much more compelling case can be made for
requiring notice to a party who is in default but has
nonetheless elected to participate at some level." 2000 UT
75, H 24, 11 P.3d 277 (emphasis added). However, the
court was not discussing what constitutes an appearance.
See id. 1fl[ 23-26. Rather, the court was addressing
whether or not service was required when a party
appeared and then defaulted. See id. 1ft[ 4, 23-26
(addressing situation where, after filing the complaint, the
plaintiffs did not answer the defendants' counterclaim
because they believed the action was stayed when the
plaintiff filed for bankruptcy). Moreover, far from
disavowing Central Bank & Trust, the court reaffirmed
that case by reiterating that "[i]n Central Bank & Trust,
the defaulting party never made an appearance." Id. \ 27.
FN9. Because the court clerk is authorized to enter
default judgment under rule 55 only if the party is in
default for failure to appear and the other requirements
are met, see Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b), one of the benefits of
the minority position is that it creates a bright-line test
that the clerk can use when determining whether or not
default is appropriate. In contrast, "[t]he clerk is in no
position to know whether there have been discussions or
documents exchanged among the parties and thus, under
the majority definition of the term, cannot determine with
certainty whether any party has or has not x appeared' in
the action." 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal
Practice § 55.33[4][b] (3d ed.2008).
FN 10. During oral arguments on appeal, counsel for
Arbogast stated that he believed his June 29, 2006 letter
constituted sufficient notice under the Standards of
Professionalism and Civility. We have no reason to
question the sincerity of that belief. We think, however,
the applicable standard requires more than a prospective
notice that a complaint will be due in twenty days.
Otherwise, a summons, which by rule informs a
defendant when an answer is due, see Utah R. Civ. P.
4(c)(1), would also be sufficient notice, and the
applicable standard would have added little. We therefore
interpret this particular standard as requiring notice after
the allotted passage of time for filing an answer but
before a party actually seeks to obtain the entry of
default.
FN11. River Crossings' primary argument to the trial
court was that counsel had mistakenly believed the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure were similar to the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure, which require three days notice
before entering default judgment when a party has
appeared. Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 55, yWr/zNev. R. Civ.
P. 55(b)(2). See also McNair v. Rivera, 110 Nev. 463, 874

P.2d 1240, 1245 (1994) ("An appearance for purposes of
NRCP 55(b)(2) does not require a presentation or
submission to the court; indeed, a course of negotiation
between attorneys is sufficient to constitute an
appearance. . . . " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
River Crossings does not raise this argument on appeal.
FN 12. Arbogast primarily contends that no such
statement promising notification before default was
made.
FN 13. Even if counsel was not aware of the
proceedings in this case, we are not convinced that relief
under rule 60(b) would be required. See generally
Kennard v. Kennard, 2008 UT App 134, fl 16, 21-24,
183 P.3d 1052 (holding problems with counsel's mail
were not sufficient grounds for rule 60 relief where
counsel did not act with due diligence).
FN 14. Nor do we agree with River Crossings'
argument that the trial court's finding is misleading. Not
only is the trial court's finding correct, but it helps refute
River Crossings' supposed belief that settlement
discussions were ongoing. All of the previous settlement
discussions had occurred through the parties' respective
counsel. The fact that all communication between counsel
stopped after the June 29, 2006 letter suggests that
settlement efforts had ceased.
FN 15. The following colloquy occurred during oral
arguments in the trial court:
[Counsel:] Our argument is that the June 29th, 2006
letter, while it said file an answer, I request that you file
an answer, there wasn't the s[word] of Damocles, if you
don't, boom, you are d o n e . . . .
[The Court]: Counsel, doesn't that somewhat imply that? .

[Counsel]: Well, the implication is there.
UT

p.3dMy client has previously granted your
client an extension of time within which to
answer the complaint. However, given the
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present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client,
hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this
letter.

